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Case No. 20100983 SC 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
Donna Whitney, individually and as parent and heir of Dillon Whitney, 
deceased, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
Utah Department of Juvenile Justice Services and Utah Department of 
Human Services, subdivisions of the State of Utah, 
Defendants/Appellants. 
Defendants' Reply Brief on Certified Question of Utah Law 
Defendants respectfully submit this reply brief. 
I. PLAINTIFF IGNORES THE CERTIFIED QUESTION, 
BUT IT SHOULD BE AFFIRMED. 
Plaintiff ignores the Immunity Act's plain language and wrongly 
focuses on the Youth Corrections Act instead. Plaintiff fails to mention 
this Court's Madsen IEmery test, but rests her claims on an incomplete 
reading of the Utah Court of Appeals' decision in Pace v. St George City 
Police Dep't, 2006 UT App. 494, 153 P.3d 789. And Plaintiff ignores the 
certified question, but urges this Court to sustain the federal district 
court's decision and order. Plaintiffs opening brief is not helpful. The 
Court should disregard it. 
A. Plaintiff ignores the Immunity Act's plain language. 
Plaintiff does not analyze the incarceration exception's plain 
language, that states: 
Immunity from suit of each governmental entity is 
not waived . . . if the injury arises out of, in 
connection with, or results from . . . (j) the 
incarceration of any person in any . . . other place 
of legal confinement. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-301(5)(j) (emphasis added). That exception is 
plain on its face and is not limited to penal institutions. It is also not 
limited to persons in jail, on the way to jail, or who are situated in other 
places of secure confinement. See Plaintiffs Opening Br. pp. 15-17. 
But the Act applies to "each governmental entity" and to "any person" 
in "any . . . other place of legal confinement." See Utah Code Ann. § 
63G-7-301(5)(j). 
This Court should reject Plaintiffs attempt to restrict the Act's 
2 
plain terms, to read new meanings into those terms, or to "place a 
condition on the applicability of the [incarceration] exception without 
textual justification." See Moss v. Pete Suazo Athletic Comm'n, 2007 UT 
99,11 13, 175 P.3d 1042. Here, Plaintiffs injury arose out of and is 
causally connected to Dillon Whitney's legal confinement to DHS's 
custody, and his out-of-home placement in a DJJS-supervised proctor 
home. Plaintiffs recovery for that injury is barred by the face of the 
incarceration exception. Because that exception, not Utah's Youth 
Corrections Act1 controls, Defendants retain their immunity from 
Plaintiffs negligence claims. 
B. Plaintiff ignores this Court's governing law. 
This Court's prior decisions establish that a person is incarcerated 
under the Immunity Act when he is "under the control of the State," 
Madsen v. State, 538 P.2d 92, 93 (Utah 1978), and unable to "be 
1
 Defendants addressed that Act's applicability at pages 15-16 of their 
opening brief. The Youth Corrections Act aids, not contradicts, Defendants' 
governmental immunity. Moreover, because the incarceration exception is 
plain on its face - and this Court's prior decisions interpreting that exception 
settled - the Court has no reason to resort to extraneous sources to aid its 
statutory interpretation. See Grappendorfv. Pleasant Grove City, 2007 UT 
84, f 9, 173 P.3d 166. 
3 
released [from that control] without some kind of permission." Emery v. 
State, 438 P.2d 1296, 1297 (Utah 1971).2 Immunity, the Court has 
stated, rests on whether the person is subject to state control, not 
merely on whether he is confined to prison or a jail. See Emery, 438 
P.2d at 1297. 
Plaintiff does not cite that test, but she continues to focus on dicta 
from the Utah Court of Appeals' decision in Pace. But that case, when 
read as a whole, supports Defendants' immunity here. See Defendants' 
Opening Br., pp 13-14. 
Dillon Whitney was incarcerated because he engaged in unlawful 
conduct. He died while in state custody and while under state control. 
The juvenile court controlled Dillon Whitney's care and supervision, and 
also determined where Dillon could reside. See Madsen, 538 P.2d at 93. 
Dillon Whitney was not free to return home or to live with his parents, 
and neither Dillon nor his parents could secure his release without 
2
 The Court has perpetuated that definition - without reservation -
since it was first announced. See Epting v. State, 546 P.2d 242, 243 (Utah 
1976); Kirk v. State, 784 P.2d 1255, 1257 (Utah 1989); Peck v. State, 2008 UT 
39, 191 P.3d 4, 7. 
4 
juvenile court permissio , • • u /. mdec J, Dillon 
Whitney only possessed U ave In- visil his fnlhrr on the eve of his tragic 
death becauM1 Judgr VnMiv expressly .inthorized Dillon to do so. 
Plaintiff ignore I hose settled facts, and argues tha t when DJJS 
placed 1 lillnii in i,"i community-based proctor home, it placed him in the 
"- * -t large." See Plaintiffs Opening Br, pp ] 5-1 3. But many 
of l/ho fVi rt.s; that Plaintiff alleges in support were not plead in Plaintiffs 
Amended Complaint and are not properly before the Court.3 See 
Healthcare Sews. Grp. Im\ u, Utah Dep't of Health, 2002 
p.3d 591. Moreover, they are irrelevant. The incarceration exception 
retains Defendant's sovereign immunity despite the alleged negligent e 
He was incarcerated, in a place of legal, contmemen I '" I11Is < "<»111'< s111»«11il 
affirm the certified question, .' • -
3
 Those additional facts include Plaint n 6 aiiegaiiuau- .,.. ,-agt-s lb-18 of 
her opening brief that 1) defendants permitted Dillon to go where he wanted 
and do whatever he chose; 2) Dillon possessed his own .aanunnurea 
entrance/exit; 3) Dillon's whereabouts were not nioniloivd at night f h< 
possessed an., unlimited bus pass; and 5) defendants showed no eon. <sn v rien 
they could not contact Dillon because it was exported 1 hat ho "would hi- -t in 
the community." 
5 
II. THE GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT DOES NOT 
VIOLATE UTAH'S CONSTITUTION. 
Utah's Immunity Act is sound and withstands Plaintiffs 
complaint that as applied here, the incarceration exception (1) results in 
unequal application of Utah law, see UTAH CONST, art. I § 24; (2) it 
violates the open courts clause, see id., art I, § 11; and (3) the exception 
contravenes Plaintiffs right to recover damages for wrongful death. See 
id., art. XVI § 5. Each claim fails as a matter of law. 
A. The Incarceration Exception Will Not Result in 
Unequal Application of Utah Law. 
Article 1, section 24 of the Utah Constitution states "All laws of a 
general nature shall have uniform operation." UTAH CONST. Art. 1, § 
24. That section demands "that 'persons similarly situated should be 
treated similarly, and persons in different circumstances should not be 
treated as if their circumstances were the same.'" Ross v. Schackel, 920 
P.2d 1159, 1167 (Utah 1996) (citation omitted). Plaintiff maintains the 
incarceration exception violates article I, section 24 because the 
incarceration exception immunizes the State from negligence claims 
6 
connected to a iiiiiioi"'-« confmrmeiil in proHm uin1,, )>lit not irom claims 
arising from a minor's fnnior plnn'inenl To accept that assertion, this 
( VHII I, must assume (Juii holh classes of minor are the same. They are 
t. 
Foster care provides a safe haven for children who have suffered 
abuse4 or nee, I net, or who are dependent through no fault of their 
parent,!- ; See Utah Code Ann. § 62A-4a-l 01(23) & generally, F'I nctor 
care, or "community-based placement" on the other hand, constitutes 
one of the myriad alternatives for placement of a minor in state eiisl* d,v 
due his or her own, delinquent conduct. See id. at § bL, i 
this sense alone, children placed in foster care are 
to children placed in proctor hom.es, Foster children cnnn» into '"laic 
custody due t. \\n fault o* J.<i»- i ... , . • . e 
into cr? tod ...K i v - j - . . : . • , ' n, 
^ ^
 T
 ' , ^ - H iltinle v xrU. 
The Act addresses inmuiv. ;i>dfinlic^al(^ i \\x ( hat court as abused and ' 
neglected separately Irom MIIIIMIN adjudicated as delinquent. See 78A-6-
7 
101 et seq. (West 2009).4 Pertinent here are Parts 3, 4 and 6 of that act. 
Part 3 addresses children adjudicated by the juvenile court as abused, 
neglected and dependent. See Id. at §§ 78A-6-301 to -323 ("Abuse, 
Neglect, and Dependency Proceedings"). Part 4 governs delinquent 
youth and states that "[t]he processes and procedures described in Part 
3 . . . are not applicable to a minor who is committed to the custody of 
the [Division] on a basis other than abuse or neglect and who [is] 
classified in the division's management system as having been placed in 
custody primarily on the basis of delinquent behavior or a status 
offense." Id. § 78A-6-401 ("Minors in Custody on Grounds Other Than 
Abuse or Neglect") (emphasis added). And Part 6, addresses the 
juvenile court's unique jurisdiction over delinquency actions. Id. § 78A-
6-601 et seq. ("Delinquency and Criminal Actions.")5 
4
 Plaintiff does not address those statutory differences, but focuses 
instead on the how youth programs become licensed. See Pla's Opening Br. 
pp. 20-21. That argument misses the point. A uniform operation of law 
analysis looks to whether "persons" are similarly situated, not to whether 
state facilities are similarly licensed. 
5
 Similarly, section 78A-6-117 sets out the alternate dispositions 
available to a state juvenile court judge regarding delinquent youth subject to 
the court's jurisdiction. That statute also differentiates abused and neglected 
children from delinquent youth. See Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-117(c), (d) 
(West. Supp. 2010). 
8 
The Utah Human Services i 'ode makes similar distinctions; • 
cliapler 'la caiilains I IK1 i "(nM mil Kamilv Services Act, while chapter 7 
svti mil (In' ' ill li I nnvrlions AH See id. § tJ2A-4a-101and § 62A-7-
1. 
11*1 Hi HI VVhii.ney was ad indicated as delinquent and committed to 
DHS\ mstoilv j„md DJJS's supervision because? he committed acts that 
would have been felonies if committed by an adult. See id, § 62A-7- .-• 
101(8), (30). He was adjudicated according to, and his placement 
determined by the Youth Corrections Act. Dillon Whitney was a 
delinquent youth, not a foster child. Granting Uetendants immuj 
under those circumstances does not offend Utah s constitution. 
B. The Incarceration Exception Docs I 1 11 ( \ '" i 1  1 : i i "i 
the Utah Open Courts Clause. 
Utah'~ rpen coun> , .ancp r>m\7i , , . . , . _ t s 
right tr %meu\ * . I 
orreputatiw • * rei.
 v. hec^vA^}uaft 
Corp ^ clause protects oUL^ianil «. 
9 
and procedural rights, but it "is not an absolute guarantee of all 
substantive rights." Tindley v. Salt Lake City Sch. Dist, 2005 UT 30, f 
17, 116 P.3d 295, 300. The clause does not guarantee Plaintiffs claims 
here. 
A statute violates the open courts clause if it abrogates a right or 
remedy in existence at the time of its enactment. See Berry, 111 P.2d 
at 680; see also Tindley, 2005 UT 30, \ 17; Laney v. Fairview City, 2002 
UT 79, f 50, 57 P.3d 1007, 1021-23. Accordingly, the legislature stands 
"free to abrogate or limit claims that could not have been brought under 
then-existing law. Claims barred by the doctrine of governmental 
immunity are an example of this principle." Tindley, 2005 UT 30, f 17; 
see also Madsen v. Borthick, 658 P.2d 627, 620 (Utah 1983) ("Article I, § 
11 worked no change in the principle of sovereign immunity, and 
sovereign immunity is not unconstitutional under that section.")6 
6
 This Court has consistently upheld the Immunity Act in the face of an 
open courts challenge. See Moss v. Pete Suazo Utah Athletic Comm'n, 2007 
UT 99, 175 P.3d 1042 (barring wrongful death action by heir to professional 
boxer under permit exception); Tindley, 2005 UT 30 (upholding Immunity 
Act's damages cap); Ross, 920 P.2d at 1162-1163 (Utah 1996) (barring inmate 
suit against prison doctor under incarceration exception and second Berry 
prong); but see Day u. Utah Dep't of Pub. Safety, 980 P.2d 1171, 1183-1187 
(Utah 1999) (finding open courts clause violation where statute failed to meet 
10 
The Utah Legislature first adopted the Immunity Act, including 
the incarceration exception, in 1965. Prior to that time, government 
entities "were afforded immunity to the extent that their activities 
qualified as government functions." Tindley, 2005 UT 30, f 20 (citation 
omitted). Under the common law, there was no right to sue the State. 
See Tiede v. State, 915 P.2d 500, 503-504 (Utah 1996). 
Plaintiff agrees that committing a delinquent minor to state 
custody constitutes a government function. See Pla's Opening Br., p. 
11. And she must concede this Court's holding in Tiede. To determine, 
therefore, whether the incarceration exception violates the open courts 
clause, the Court need only decide whether Plaintiff would have 
possessed a right to bring her claims prior to 1965. Plaintiff has 
pointed to no such authority and Defendants have searched, but have 
found none. 
Instead, Plaintiff contends that because in 1983, this Court 
recognized a cause of action against the Division of Child and Family 
Services (DCFS) for negligent placement of a foster child, the Court also 
Berry test). 
11 
recognized a cause of action for negligent placement of all children in 
state's custody. Pla's Opening Br. p. 23 (citing Little v. Utah Div. of 
Family Servs., 667 P.2d 49 (Utah 1983)). But Little does not support 
the inference that Plaintiff urges. 
First, by the time Little was decided in 1983, this Court had 
already recognized that the State retained immunity for an injury that 
"'(10) arises out of the incarceration of any person in any state prison, 
county or city jail, or other place of legal confinement. ..'" Emery v. 
State, 483 P.2d 1296 (Utah 1971) (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-
10(10) (1965)). Moreover, in Little, the Court considered only whether 
the discretionary function exception barred the plaintiffs' claim against 
DCFS for negligent placement of a foster child. See Little, 667 P.2d at 
50-51. Here, the Court must examine whether these Defendants -
DHS and DJJS - retain immunity under the incarceration exception for 
actions related to Dillon Whitney's delinquent placement. Little neither 
addressed nor contemplated those claims. That decision is inapposite. 
Plaintiff has not shown that prior to 1965 she possessed the right 
to sue Defendants under similar facts. Therefore, retaining Defendants 
immunity here neither limits nor abrogates a prior right of action. 
12 
Absent such abrogation, the Court should reject Plaintiffs alternate 
claim. 
C. The Incarceration Exception Does Not Violate 
the Right to Recover Damages for Wrongful 
Death. 
The incarceration exception also does not violate the right to 
recover damages for wrongful death provided by article XVT, section 5 of 
the Utah Constitution. That section states, in part: 
[t]he right to recover for injuries resulting in 
death, shall never be abrogated, and the amount 
recoverable shall not be subject to any statutory 
limitation.. . 
UTAH CONST, art. XVI, § 5. 
Nearly 100 years ago, the Court stated "the Constitution clearly 
prohibits the Legislature from abrogating" the wrongful death right of 
action. See Garfield Smelting Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 53 Utah 133, 
138-39, 178 P. 57, 59 (1918). There, the Court observed that to 
determine whether that right has been abrogated, it is '"necessary to 
inquire what th[e] right was and who enjoyed it at the time the 
Constitution was adopted . . . . hence the right referred to must be 
13 
deemed to be the right as it then existed and not merely an abstract 
rights Tiede, 915 P.2d at 504 (quoting Garfield, 53 Utah at 138-39, 178 
P. at 59 (emphasis added in Tiede)). 
At the time Utah adopted its constitution, "[sovereign immunity 
was a settled feature of the common law." Id. at 504. And since 1986, 
this Court has held that at common law, there was no right to sue the 
State for wrongful death. Id. The Court has not strayed from that 
conclusion, or from its belief that "by retaining governmental immunity 
from wrongful death suits against the State [the Immunity Act] does 
not abrogate any previously existing right of action and therefore does 
not violate article XVI, section 5." Id; see Tindley, 2005 UT 30, f 36; 
Parks v. Utah Transit Auth., 2002 UT 55, \ 15, 53 P.3d 473. 
Plaintiff acknowledges this authority and also the Court's 
reasoning, but she claims it is wrong. A party seeking to overturn 
precedent assumes the "substantial burden" to convince the Court that 
the standard "was clearly erroneous or conditions have changed so as to 
render the prior decision inapplicable." State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 
399 & n.3 (Utah 1994); see Laney v. Fairview City, 2002 UT 79, f 45, 57 
14 
P.3d 1007. Plaintiff has not carried that burden. 
Plaintiff maintains that when this Court first decided Tiede - and 
thereafter - it acted without the benefit of history. That case was 
wrongly decided, Plaintiff contends, because by the time Utah enacted 
its constitution in 1895, its territorial government had adopted Lord 
Campbell's Act, which stated: 
Whenever the death of a person shall be caused 
by wrongful act, neglect or default, and the act, 
neglect or default is such as would, if the death 
had not ensured, have entitled the party injured 
to maintain an action and recover damages in 
respect thereof, then, an in every such case, the 
person who, or the company or corporation which 
would have been liable if death had not ensued 
shall be liable to an action for damages, 
notwithstanding the death of the person injured, 
and although the death shall have been caused 
under such circumstances as amount to law to 
felony. 
Comp. Laws Territory of Utah 1987; 2 Comp. 1888 § 2961 (emphasis 
added). 
Lord Campbell's Act bound a person, a company, or a corporation 
responsible for wrongful death. It said nothing about the state, its 
employees, or any other governmental entity. That Act, therefore, 
15 
governed private rights of action, not claims against the state. 
The Court correctly decided Tiede. That case governs Plaintiffs 
claims. This Court should reject Plaintiffs converse argument. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing, Defendants urge the Court to affirm the 
certified question and to disregard Plaintiffs alternative state 
constitutional claims. 
Respectfully submitted this 14th day of July, 2011. 
MARKL. SHURTLEFF 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
BRIDOET K: ROMANO 
Utah Solicitor General 
Attorneys for State Defendants 
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